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UNWAIVABLE:  PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
CLAIMS AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
Myriam Gilles* & Gary Friedman** 
INTRODUCTION 
In California, two foundational laws have framed the debate around 
waivers of contractual rights since their codification in 1872.  The first—the 
“anti-waiver rule”—stated that while any citizen may contractually consent 
to “waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit,” any “law 
established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private 
agreement.”1  An accompanying rule—the “anti-exculpation rule”—held 
that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object . . . to exempt anyone from 
responsibility for his own fraud . . . or violation of law . . . are against the 
policy of the law.”2 
With these rules, California inaugurated a public policy of restraining 
parties’ ability to leverage bargaining power to exempt themselves from 
public legal obligations via private contracts.  Early California courts often 
relied on the anti-waiver and anti-exculpation rules, later codified as sections 
3513 and 1668 of the California Civil Code, respectively (together, “Sections 
3513 and 1668”), when enforcing this public policy.  So, for example, in 
Grannis v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco,3 a party tried 
to waive the right to enforce a divorce decree.4  The Supreme Court of 
California declared that “there can be no effectual waiv[ing] by the parties of 
any restriction established by law for the benefit of the public.”5  Given the 
state’s interest “in the preservation and permanence of the marriage relation,” 
laws enacted to protect marriage could not be relinquished by private 
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 1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2020) (emphasis added). 
 2. Id. § 1668. 
 3. 79 P. 891 (Cal. 1905). 
 4. Id. at 892. 
 5. Id. at 895. 
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agreement, nor could parties exculpate themselves from their legal 
obligations under the law.6 
As time passed, laws “established for a public reason”7 grew to fill 
volumes of California’s code, and courts continued to hold that such laws 
were unwaivable by private contract.  For example, in the 1930s, the state 
enacted provisions mandating “formal foreclosure proceedings” to protect 
debtors bankrupted by the Great Depression.8  In Winklemen v. Sides,9 the 
California Supreme Court refused to enforce advance contractual waivers of 
these statutory protections, which it held were enacted “to benefit a large 
class of the inhabitants of the state,” specifically “the debtor class.”10  In these 
and many other contexts, lawmakers and judges together shaped public 
policy by declaring rights enacted for the general welfare unwaivable.11 
California’s anti-waiver policies took on special importance with the 
advent of the consumer rights revolution of the 1960s, an era in which many 
states enacted legislation to protect consumers from market abuses.12  For its 
part, California extended its unfair competition law (UCL) to include an array 
of consumer claims13 and passed a sweeping Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act14 (CLRA).  These laws offered the state’s citizens powerful tools to 
remedy widespread harms15—including the right to seek public injunctive 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. CIV. § 3513. 
 8. See Winklemen v. Sides, 88 P.2d 147, 156 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (dictum) 
(“California has enacted an exact system and a definite procedure for foreclosure of mortgages 
and deeds of trust.  These laws in effect at the time of the execution of the mortgage or deed 
of trust enter into and become a part of such contracts.”). 
 9. 88 P.2d 147 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939). 
 10. Id. at 158 (citation omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., Am. Philatelic Soc’y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (declaring 
“the right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit”); Friedman v. Pac. Outdoor 
Advert. Co., 170 P.2d 67, 69, 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (declaring a municipal law 
prohibiting “the burning of brush, waste material, dry grass and weeds on any lot not set aside 
for such purposes” to be “an ordinance enacted for the public good [that] cannot be 
contravened by private agreement”); De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 
983, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (“The rights of employees as now declared by section 
2855 of the Labor Code fall squarely within the prohibition of section 3513 of the Civil Code, 
that rights created in the public interest may not be contravened by private agreement.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, State Consumer Protection in a Federal System, 1975 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 715, 716 (describing the “growth of concern and activity at the state level” with 
the enactment of consumer protection laws “since 1965 and many since 1970”). 
 13. Act Effective Aug. 21, 1933, 1933 Cal. Stat. 2482, ch. 953, § 1 (codified as amended 
in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 2020)) (“Any person performing or 
proposing to perform an act of unfair competition within this State may be enjoined in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.”).  The UCL was later moved to the Business and Professions 
Code and codified at sections 17200–17210. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 
950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal. 1998) (dictum). 
 14. 1970 Cal. Stat. 3157 (codified as amended in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (West 
2020)). 
 15. An early version of the UCL was especially broad and authorized “any person” to act 
as a kind of “private attorney general” in bringing actions for injunctions in the name of the 
“general public.” See Act Effective July 8, 1977, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1202, ch. 299, § 1 (codified 
as amended in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2020)).  A 2004 referendum known 
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relief against “unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general 
public.”16  Recognizing that these remedies would be neutralized if 
consumers were forced to waive their rights in exchange for a product or 
service, legislators incorporated powerful anti-waiver language to prevent 
powerful market actors from leveraging their superior bargaining power to 
rob consumers of legal rights.17 
The California public rights tradition was likewise on display in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, as the state’s flourishing economy attracted an influx 
of workers in search of better employment opportunities.18  This explosive 
job growth left the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency 
(LWDA) unable to monitor the state’s hundreds of thousands of 
workplaces.19  Exploitative black-market labor and underground economies 
soon emerged in this unregulated environment, driving down “wages, 
eliminat[ing] benefits, and reduc[ing] job security” for many low-wage 
workers.20  Seeking to address the widening enforcement gap and prevent 
employers from “violating the law with impunity,”21 the state legislature 
enacted the Private Attorney General Act of 200422 (PAGA).  The statute 
deputizes the state’s workers, authorizing them to bring suit “personally and 
on behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for 
 
as Proposition 64 limited the standing provision to injured persons. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE. §§ 17204, 17535 (West 2020). 
 16. McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 87 (Cal. 2017) (first citing Cruz v. PacifiCare 
Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1164 (Cal. 2003); and then citing Broughton v. Cigna 
Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 74 (Cal. 1999)) (dictum); see also § 1, 1933 Cal. Stat. at 
2482. 
 17. See, e.g., Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 2020) (“Any 
waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be 
unenforceable and void.”); Id. § 1670.5(a) (providing that courts may refuse to enforce any 
contract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made” or may “limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result”). 
 18. See James Sterngold, A Changing California Emerges from Recession, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 29, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/29/us/a-changing-california-emerges-
from-recession.html [https://perma.cc/3Z8V-4XFS] (describing “renewed growth” in the 
California economy and quoting experts as predicting net inflows of people). 
 19. See S. JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 796, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 
2003) (defining “underground economy” to mean “businesses operating outside the state’s tax 
and licensing requirements” and estimating that, in 2003, the state lost approximately $3–6 
billion in taxes from the lack of regulation). 
 20. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS:  SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE 
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 216 (2003). 
 21. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 796, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 
3–4 (Cal. 2003). 
 22. 2003 Cal. Stat. 6628 (codified as amended in CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.6 (West 
2020)); see also Arias v. Superior Ct., 209 P.3d 923, 929–30 (Cal. 2009) (“In September 2003, 
the Legislature enacted the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.  The 
Legislature declared that adequate financing of labor law enforcement was necessary to 
achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws, that staffing levels for labor law 
enforcement agencies had declined and were unlikely to keep pace with the future growth of 
the labor market, and that it was therefore in the public interest to allow aggrieved employees, 
acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with 
the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over private 
enforcement efforts.”). 
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Labor Code violations.”23  Here again, where employers have demanded that 
workers relinquish these statutory enforcement rights as a precondition to 
employment, California courts have steadfastly held that “PAGA’s purpose 
as a law-enforcement mechanism” renders an employee’s right to bring a 
claim under the statute unwaivable by private agreement.24 
In the enactment of PAGA and the inclusion of public injunction rights 
conferred by the UCL and CLRA, we see California’s embrace of the private 
attorney general model and, yet again, evidence of the state’s 150-year 
commitment to the unwaivability of actions to enforce public rights. 
But now, the advent of mandatory arbitration clauses in standard-form 
contracts is putting California’s tradition of respect for unwaivable rights to 
a stress test.  In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s judge-
made rule that recognized an unwaivable right of workers and consumers to 
proceed collectively in resolving disputes, whether in court or arbitration,25 
was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act26 (FAA).  The import of the 
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence for PAGA, public injunction 
cases, and other expressions of California’s policies against the private 
waiver of public rights warrants close scrutiny.  In recent years, state and 
federal courts in California have upheld these provisions against preemption 
challenges, but efforts by the Chamber of Commerce and its allies to upend 
California’s tradition of respecting unwaivable public rights will not abate 
soon.27 
This Essay is the first to examine the implications of California’s recent 
jurisprudence holding public enforcement claims unwaivable in standard-
form contracts of adhesion and the inevitable clash with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the FAA.  With its rich history of rebuffing efforts to deprive 
citizens of public rights through private contract, California provides an ideal 
laboratory for exploring this escalating conflict.  Indeed, as a number of other 
states are now on the verge of enacting statutes like PAGA and granting 
 
 23. Arias, 209 P.3d at 930 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2020)).  An “aggrieved 
employee” is defined as an employee “against whom one or more of the alleged violations 
was committed.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(c) (West 2020). 
 24. See, e.g., Plaisted v. Dress Barn, Inc., No. 12-cv-01679, 2012 WL 4356158, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012). 
 25. See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (ruling that a 
class-banning arbitration clause was unenforceable under California law), abrogated by 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also infra notes 38–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15.  See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. 
 27. While arbitration advocates and corporate defense firms have sought review of these 
decisions as contravening Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on 
whether its FAA jurisprudence applies to waivers of public enforcement claims. See, e.g., John 
B. Lewis & Dustin M. Dow, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Iskanian Only 
Hardens the Federal-State Divide Over PAGA Claims, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2015), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5f5dbb2a-d9d8-4c50-b636-42096834feab 
[https://perma.cc/64QS-7BRK]. 
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public injunction remedies like those provided by the CLRA,28 many eyes 
are on the viability of public enforcement claims. 
A series of conflicts dating back a decade forms the backdrop for the 
impending conflict and the structure of this Essay.  Round One begins by 
surveying the initial clash between California’s policy prohibiting 
contractual waivers of the right to collective adjudication and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the FAA.  In that early skirmish, a divided Supreme 
Court held that the FAA preempted state law rules that stand as an obstacle 
to the FAA’s own objectives.  In the intervening years, many forms of state 
regulation of arbitration clauses have been found preempted.29  But not so in 
California, where the state’s provision of collective remedies under PAGA 
and consumer protection laws have withstood FAA preemption challenges.  
As we show in the final two parts of this Essay, federal and state courts in 
California have repeatedly reaffirmed the state’s long-standing prohibitions 
on private contractual waivers of substantive rights, even where those 
waivers are couched in otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements.  We 
conclude by offering a set of predictions about the continued legal challenges 
that lie ahead, as well as inevitable efforts to “draft around” principles of 
unwaivable public rights. 
I.  ROUND ONE:  THE WAIVABLE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE ADJUDICATION 
Mandatory arbitration provisions require parties to waive their right to 
resolve disputes in courts and to pursue claims in private arbitration instead.30  
These provisions may also demand that parties waive their rights to 
procedures and remedies that ordinarily attend public litigation, such as the 
right to seek punitive damages or enjoin future wrongdoing.31  Perhaps most 
controversial are arbitration clauses containing collective action waivers, 
which prohibit parties from aggregating their claims in court or in arbitration.  
In instances involving small per-plaintiff damages, waivers of the right to 
proceed collectively render the substantive rights at issue unenforceable as a 
practical matter and release the defendant from any potential liability.  
Accordingly, class-banning arbitration clauses raise precisely the kind of 
 
 28. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui Tam:  A Model for the 
Enforcement of Group Rights in a Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489, 538 n.224 (2020) 
(reporting that qui tam bills have been formally introduced in Maine, New York, Vermont, 
and Washington). 
 29. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Homes Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–28 
(2017) (holding that the FAA preempted Kentucky’s application of its judge-made “clear 
statement” rule in nursing home admissions contracts, which required additional assent to 
arbitration); Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532–33 (2012) (per curiam) 
(holding that the FAA preempted reliance on public policy in refusing to enforce arbitration 
clauses in nursing home admissions documents). 
 30. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. out on a Limb?:  Comparing the U.S. Approach 
to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. 
MIA. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2002) (noting that a hallmark of mandatory, binding arbitration is 
the “eliminati[on of] the claimant’s right to present claims to a judge or jury”). 
 31. See generally SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT:  ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 41–46 (2015) (stating that arbitration clauses have also 
been used to shorten statutes of limitation and restrict discovery). 
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public policy concerns that prompted Sections 3513 and 1668 of the 
California Civil Code. 
As class-banning arbitration clauses began to proliferate in consumer and 
small business contracts in the late 1990s and early 2000s, litigants initially 
challenged their enforcement on unconscionability and public policy 
grounds.32  California’s courts were then asked to determine the 
enforceability of these class action waivers in light of the state’s strong anti-
waiver/anti-exculpation policies, on the one hand, and the “federal policy 
favoring arbitration” embodied in the FAA, on the other.33  In a series of 
cases from that era, the courts made plain that state policy would take 
priority.  For example, in 2002 a California intermediate appellate court 
declared in Szetela v. Discover Bank34 that a collective action waiver in a 
standard-form consumer credit card contract was unconscionable and 
unenforceable in California.35  Citing Sections 3513 and 1668, the panel held 
that the waiver “contradicts the California Legislature’s stated policy of 
discouraging unfair and unlawful business practices, and of creating a 
mechanism for a representative to seek relief on behalf of the general public 
as a private attorney general.”36  Following almost immediately on the heels 
of Szetela, the Ninth Circuit adopted this interpretation of state law in holding 
similar collective action bans unenforceable.37 
Two years later, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court38 again confronted a collective action waiver imposed in a 
standard-form arbitration clause.39  The provision at issue required 
cardmembers, as a condition of using their credit cards, to waive any rights 
to “consolidate claims in arbitration . . . or arbitrate any claim as a 
 
 32. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 399 (2005) (describing “first-wave” 
unconscionability challenges under FAA § 2, which provides that a party may oppose 
arbitration on such “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 
 33. See id. at 394; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (announcing a “federal policy favoring arbitration” (quoting Moses H. 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))). 
 34. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 35. Id. at 867–68 (finding “manifest one-sidedness of the no class action provision at issue 
here . . . blindingly obvious” because “credit card companies typically do not sue their 
customers in class action lawsuits” and deducing that the provision was therefore “clearly 
meant to prevent customers . . . from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, 
such as the $29 [plaintiff] sought”). 
 36. Id. at 868. 
 37. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that class action 
waivers in a CLRA claim violated California law, relying in part on Szetela); see also Ingle v. 
Cir. City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the same). 
 38. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333 (2011). 
 39. Id. at 1103.  The plaintiff alleged that Discover Bank imposed a twenty-nine-dollar 
late fee on payments received on the payment due date but after its undisclosed 1:00 p.m. “cut-
off time” in violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, which prohibits 
misrepresentations “of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, 
suppression or omission in connection with the sale, lease or advertisement of any 
merchandise.” Id. at 1104 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513 (2020)). 
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representative or member of a class or in a private attorney general 
capacity.”40  Stressing the importance of collective adjudication to the 
vindication of consumer rights,41 the Discover Bank court held the waiver 
exculpatory under section 1668 and violative of state public policy.42 
Cognizant that its ruling could invite FAA preemption challenges,43 the 
Discover Bank court took pains to clarify that its decision did “not 
specifically apply to arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally.”44  So 
while refusing to enforce the class action waiver, the court offered that class-
wide arbitration remained available to the parties—underscoring that its 
decision did not discriminate against arbitration per se.45  And, in the wake 
of Discover Bank, “at least fourteen states ha[ve] ruled class action waivers 
unenforceable on [similarly] broad public policy grounds.”46 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,47 however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
abrogated the Discover Bank rule as preempted by the FAA.48  Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s majority decision did not dispute that the Discover Bank 
rule was facially applicable to both litigation and arbitration.49  But the Court 
recognized that the only way to accommodate both the FAA and the 
California policy against waiving class procedures was to demand that the 
 
 40. Id. at 1103 (typeface altered for readability) (quoting Discover Bank’s cardholder 
agreement arbitration clause). 
 41. Id. at 1109 (“Some courts have viewed class actions or arbitrations as a merely 
procedural right, the waiver of which is not unconscionable.  But as the . . . cases of this court 
have continually affirmed, class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer 
context, often inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights.  Affixing the 
‘procedural’ label on such devices understates their importance and is not helpful . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
 42. Id. at 1110.  Specifically, the court held that the collective action waiver effectively 
denies litigants the ability to remedy violations of state laws under section 3513 and exculpates 
the defendant from liability for a violation of section 1668 involving: 
a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the 
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is 
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme 
to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money . . . . 
Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempted 
section 229 of the California Labor Code). 
 44. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1112.  The court added that its holding “applies equally 
to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class 
arbitration waivers in contracts with such agreements.” Id. 
 45. Id. at 1112–13 (“The FAA does not federalize the law of unconscionability or related 
contract defenses except to the extent that it forbids the use of such defenses to discriminate 
against arbitration clauses.  There is no such discrimination here with respect to California’s 
rule against class action waivers.” (citation omitted)). 
 46. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:  Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633 (2012); see also id. at 633 n.33 (citing 
cases). 
 47. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 48. Id. at 352.  For the five-member majority, the state’s refusal to enforce class action 
waivers had an undue effect on arbitration because it prescribed a procedure—collective 
actions—that the Court found incompatible with the arbitral process. See id. at 350 
(“Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”). 
 49. See id. at 341–48. 
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arbitral arena play host to class actions.50  And yet, to Justice Scalia and the 
majority, class action procedure is simply irreconcilable with arbitration.51  
To allow class procedures, Concepcion holds, would “interfere[] with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[] a scheme inconsistent 
with the FAA.”52  For that reason—and that reason alone—the Court refused 
to honor California’s anti-waiver policy under the Supremacy Clause.53 
But the broad preemption principles set out in the Court’s FAA decisions 
have, thus far, been limited to class and collective action waiver.  How then 
will the Court deal with agreements that both call for arbitration and would 
waive other interests that the state deems unwaivable?  For example, where 
state law grants citizens the unwaivable right to act as a “private attorney 
general” in recovering penalties for violations of state law54 or the right to 
seek public injunctive relief against “unlawful acts that threaten future injury 
to the general public,”55 what is the import of Concepcion’s preemption 
analysis? 
II.  ROUND TWO:  THE UNWAIVABLE RIGHT TO BRING A PAGA ACTION:  
ISKANIAN AND SAKKAB 
A.  PAGA Background 
Whistleblowers—those with inside knowledge of corporate fraud or 
illegality—have long featured in American law enforcement.  Most 
prominently, the federal False Claims Act56 (FCA) relies on whistleblowers 
with material knowledge of fraud to litigate claims on behalf of the 
government.57  Additionally, “mini-FCA” statutes in twenty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia help to police fraud and obtain restitution of losses 
at the state level.58  These statutes encourage cooperative public-private 
 
 50. Id. at 348. 
 51. Id. at 349 (explaining that class arbitration “requires procedural formality” and 
observing that “[t]he [American Arbitration Association]’s rules governing class arbitrations 
mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class litigation”). 
 52. Id. at 344.  A “principal advantage” of arbitration, according to the Court, is “its 
informality.” Id. at 348.  “Requiring the availability of class-wide arbitration interferes with” 
this informality and is thus inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 344.  The Court listed three ways 
in which class-wide arbitration is “inconsistent with the FAA”:  (1) it sacrifices informality 
and makes the arbitration process slower, more expensive, and more procedurally complex; 
(2) it requires procedural formalities to protect absent class members; and (3) its higher stakes 
increase the risk to defendants without appellate review. Id. at 348–50. 
 53. Id. at 341. 
 54. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2020). 
 55. See McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 87 (Cal. 2017) (dicta) (first citing Cruz v. 
PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1164 (Cal. 2003); and then citing Broughton v. 
Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 74 (Cal. 1999)). 
 56. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). 
 57. Id. (providing for suits brought “for the person and for the United States 
Government”). 
 58. See State False Claims Act, PIETRAGALLO, https://www.falseclaimsact.com/states-
municipalities-fcas/ [https://perma.cc/KE7N-CNMD] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020); see also, e.g., 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1203(b) (2020); D.C. CODE 
§ 2-381.03 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 661-21 to 661-31 (2020); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 175/4 
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enforcement by creating financial incentives for relators (i.e., parties bringing 
qui tam actions on the government’s behalf) to come forward to prosecute 
fraud claims, as well as by providing public enforcers opportunities to 
intervene and engage with their private counterparts.59  For their part, public 
enforcers report that relator-initiated false claims act claims have been an 
effective aid in deterring unlawful activity.60 
In the employment space, California’s PAGA replicates many of the 
FCA’s essential qui tam features by providing that civil penalties ordinarily 
assessed and collected by California’s LWDA can be recovered through a 
civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of the employee and 
other current or former employees.61  If the PAGA claim is successful, the 
plaintiff and other injured employees receive a portion of the recovered 
penalties, and the remainder goes to the state labor agency.62  And, by many 
accounts, these employee-initiated suits have markedly improved employer 
compliance with statutory and regulatory mandates.63 
But, predictably, PAGA has proven deeply unpopular with business 
interests in the state, and employers have repeatedly sought contractual 
waivers of PAGA rights from their workers.64  Relying on the public 
 
(2020); MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS § 8-104 (LexisNexis 2020); MINN. STAT. § 15C.05 
(2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:32C-5 (West 2020). 
 59. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(2)–(d).  Once a relator has filed a complaint under seal, the 
government has a statutory period to decide, based on the allegations and information in the 
relator’s complaint, whether or not to pursue the claim. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (3).  If the 
government declines to join the suit, relators may proceed on their own behalf and that of the 
government; if the government chooses to take the case, the relator has a right to remain a 
named party to the suit. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B), (c)(3), (c)(1).  Should the government intervene 
and continue the suit, the relator may receive between 15 and 25 percent of any judgment; if 
the government declines to intervene, the relator’s share rises to between 25 and 30 percent. 
Id. § 3730(d)(4). 
 60. See generally, e.g., James F. Barger Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud:  An 
Empirical Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465 (2005) (reporting 
on relatively low recoveries under various state false claims acts but also finding that 
prosecutors believe these laws have been helpful in law enforcement and deterrence); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General:  Evidence from Qui Tam 
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012). 
 61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West 2020).  An “aggrieved employee” is defined as an 
employee “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” Id. § 2699(c). 
 62. Of the civil penalties recovered under PAGA, 75 percent go to the LWDA, leaving 
the remaining 25 percent for the “aggrieved employees.” Id. § 2699(i).  A prevailing PAGA 
plaintiff is also entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. § 2699(g)(1). 
 63. See Laura Reathaford & Eric Kingsley, He Said, She Said:  Employment Litigators 
Debate California’s Private Attorneys General Act, WESTLAW J. EMP. June 7, 2016, at 1, 1.  
The statute also nets the state treasury roughly upwards of $4 million per year in penalties. 
See CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELS., FISCAL YEAR 2016–2017 BUDGET CHANGE PROPOSAL:  
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT RESOURCES 1 (2016), https://esd.dof.ca.gov/Documents/ 
bcp/1617/FY1617_ORG7350_BCP474.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT8E-XU67]. 
 64. See, e.g., Tom Manzo, Opinion, California’s Crazy ‘PAGA’ Law Costs Companies 
Millions, TIMES OF SAN DIEGO (Apr. 14, 2019), https://timesofsandiego.com/opinion/ 
2019/04/14/opinion-californias-crazy-paga-law-costs-companies-millions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8GAE-LPW2] (featuring opinion piece authored by the chairman of the California Business 
and Industrial Alliance complaining that “[m]ore than 35,000 PAGA lawsuit notices have been 
sent out” since PAGA’s inception and accusing trial lawyers of bringing these claims for a 
“big payday”); Ken Monroe, PAGA Reform Would Help Grow Our Economy, ORANGE CNTY. 
460 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
enforcement character of PAGA claims and the well-established view 
expressed in section 3513 that laws “established for a public reason cannot 
be contravened by a private agreement,”65 California state and federal courts 
refused to enforce PAGA waivers throughout the 2000s.66  For example, in 
2007, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “an arbitration agreement may not function 
so as to require employees to waive potential recovery for substantive 
statutory rights in an arbitral forum, especially for statutory rights established 
‘for a public reason.’”67  The California Supreme Court concurred in 2009, 
declaring that public enforcement claims brought by employees acting “as 
the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies” were 
unwaivable.68 
But in the immediate wake of Concepcion, employers seeking to exploit 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence have tried a new tactic:  
inserting the PAGA waiver into the employee’s dispute resolution provision 
and linking this waiver of rights to the now accepted waiver of collective 
adjudication.69  A standard clause might therefore prohibit “class action and 
 
REG. (July 5, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/07/05/paga-reform-would-help-grow-
our-economy/ [https://perma.cc/9PRY-NL96] (featuring opinion piece authored by the 
chairman of the Family Business Association of California asserting that PAGA “allows 
private attorneys . . . to sue employers over any and all [Labor Code] violations, even for 
incredibly trivial issues”). 
 65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2020). 
 66. See, e.g., Arias v. Superior Ct., 209 P.3d 923, 933 (Cal. 2009) (holding that a waiver 
of PAGA rights was unenforceable because “[a]n employee plaintiff suing . . . under the 
[PAGA] does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies” and that 
“[i]n a lawsuit brought under the [PAGA], the employee plaintiff represents the same legal 
right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies—namely, recovery of civil penalties 
that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by” the state). 
 67. Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled in part 
by Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Franco v. Athens 
Disposal Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539, 558–59 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding a waiver of PAGA claims 
unconscionable because it expressly prohibited the plaintiff “from performing the core 
function of a private attorney general,” undermining the very purpose and nature of a PAGA 
enforcement action aimed at protecting the public and penalizing the employer for past illegal 
conduct). 
 68. Arias, 209 P.3d at 933.  As if anticipating Concepcion, the court also distinguished a 
class action from a PAGA action, noting that PAGA claims may but need not be brought as 
class action claims. Id. at 930 n.5; id. at 927 n.2 (stating that a “representative action” may be 
either a class or nonclass action); see also Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 
2d 1152, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A] PAGA action is essentially a representative action 
brought by a group of aggrieved employees on behalf of the State.  The primary beneficiary 
is the public at large, not the private individuals involved.”); Ochoa-Hernandez v. Cjaders 
Foods, Inc., No. C 08-2073, 2010 WL 1340777, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010) (stating that 
unlike a class action, the purpose of a PAGA suit “is to incentivize private parties to recover 
civil penalties for the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by 
overburdened state enforcement agencies”). 
 69. See, e.g., Smigelski v. PennyMac Fin. Servs., No. C081958, 2018 WL 6629406, at *2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (“[B]oth you and PennyMac forego and waive any right to join 
or consolidate claims in arbitration with others or to make claims in arbitration as a 
representative or as a member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity, unless such 
procedures are agreed to by both you and PennyMac.” (quoting the employer-employee 
Mutual Arbitration Policy)); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 184 Cal. Rptr. 
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representative action procedures,” making clear that employees may “not 
seek to represent the interests of any other person” and specifying that, as a 
condition of employment, the employee waives the right to bring or make a 
PAGA claim.70 
Initially, the enforceability of such PAGA waivers in light of the Court’s 
expansive view of the FAA was hotly litigated.  In Brown v. Ralphs Grocery 
Co.,71 decided just two months after Concepcion, a divided panel of the 
California Court of Appeal concluded that Concepcion did not govern 
waivers of the PAGA right to bring a representative action:  the purpose of 
PAGA 
contrasts with the private individual right of a consumer to pursue class 
action remedies in court or arbitration, which right, according to 
[Concepcion] may be waived by agreement so as not to frustrate the FAA—
a law governing private arbitration.  [Concepcion] does not provide that a 
public right, such as that created under the PAGA, can be waived if such a 
waiver is contrary to state law.72 
While numerous California state courts followed this reasoning,73 the federal 
courts in California largely rejected Brown, finding Concepcion controlling 
and broadly enforcing PAGA waivers in employment contracts.74  The 
California Supreme Court finally resolved this growing intrastate conflict in 
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC.75 
 
3d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2015) (describing a PAGA waiver in an employee’s arbitration 
provision). 
 70. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 133 (Cal. 2014) (dicta) (emphasis 
added) (quoting an arbitration agreement); see also Urbino, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (quoting 
a contract provision providing that “any arbitration proceeding under this Agreement will not 
be consolidated or joined with any action or legal proceeding under any other agreement or 
involving any other employees, and will not proceed as a class action, private attorney general 
action or similar representative action”). 
 71. 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 72. Id. at 860–63 (“[Concepcion] does not purport to deal with the FAA’s possible 
preemption of contractual efforts to eliminate representative private attorney general actions 
to enforce the Labor Code . . . .  If the FAA preempted state law as to the unenforceability of 
the PAGA representative action waivers, the benefits of private attorney general actions to 
enforce state labor laws would, in large part, be nullified . . . .  Until the United States Supreme 
Court rules otherwise, we continue to follow what we believe to be California law.”); see also 
Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (agreeing with 
the Brown court’s reasoning that “class action waivers contained in arbitration agreements 
may not be used to divest plaintiffs of their right to bring representative actions under PAGA”). 
 73. Notably, because Brown held that the trial court had discretion to sever the PAGA 
waiver from the arbitration agreement and send the remaining claims to arbitration, numerous 
post-Brown decisions involve severed PAGA waivers. See, e.g., Gomez v. Marukai Corp., No. 
B236623, 2013 WL 492544, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2013). 
 74. See, e.g., Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[R]equiring arbitration agreements to allow for representative PAGA claims on behalf of 
other employees would be inconsistent with the FAA.”); see also Grabowski v. C.H. Robinson 
Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (following Quevedo). 
 75. 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). 
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B.  Iskanian 
In Iskanian, the plaintiff filed both class action and PAGA claims against 
his employer for unpaid wages, although his employment contract featured a 
broad arbitration agreement that waived his right to bring “class and 
representative actions,” specifically including claims under PAGA.76  The 
California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the wage 
and hour class action as Concepcion required but held that the plaintiff could 
not be forced to waive his right to bring a PAGA action.77  Such waivers, the 
court declared, would thwart the state’s enforcement agenda as reflected in 
the PAGA statute itself—a law clearly “established for a public reason” 
within the meaning of section 3513.78  Enforcing a PAGA waiver would 
therefore “exempt the employer from responsibility for its own violation of 
law” in contravention of the policies expressed in section 1668.79 
Of course, it was not enough for the Iskanian court to observe that 
California policy prevented the waiver of PAGA rights—after all, the same 
was true for the policies against waiver of class treatment at issue in 
Concepcion.  Nor was it sufficient to observe that the policy against PAGA 
waivers applied equally in arbitral and judicial contexts.  That was true of 
Concepcion as well.80  The question was how to deal with Concepcion. 
And here, the California Supreme Court’s answer was to deny the 
existence of an arbitration agreement in the first instance, reasoning that the 
PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because it is not a dispute 
between an employer and an employee arising out of their contractual 
relationship.  It is a dispute between an employer and the state, which 
alleges directly or through its agents—either the Labor and Workforce 
Development Agency or aggrieved employees—that the employer has 
violated the Labor Code.81 
The logic of Iskanian stems from EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,82 where the 
Supreme Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) was not bound by an arbitration agreement between Waffle House 
and its employees, whose rights the agency was acting to vindicate in a public 
 
 76. Id. at 133, 145 (“There is no dispute that the contract’s term ‘representative actions’ 
covers representative actions brought under the Private Attorneys General Act.”). 
 77. Id. at 133. 
 78. Id. at 149 (“The PAGA was clearly established for a public reason, and agreements 
requiring the waiver of PAGA rights would harm the state’s interests in enforcing the Labor 
Code and in receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used to deter violations.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 141 (“Concepcion makes clear that even if a rule against class waivers 
applies equally to arbitration and nonarbitration agreements, it nonetheless interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and, for that reason, disfavors arbitration in practice.”). 
 81. Id. at 151; see also id. at 149 (“[T]he FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the 
resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and 
the [California] Labor and Workforce Development Agency.”). 
 82. 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
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enforcement action.83  On this logic, a PAGA plaintiff (or a qui tam relator) 
stands in the shoes of the state, and her PAGA claim is therefore no more 
subject to arbitration than would be a claim by a state enforcement agency 
acting upon her report of wrongdoing.84  Notably, the Iskanian court did not 
engage the question of whether PAGA actions were compatible with 
arbitration procedures or how the Supreme Court’s analysis in Concepcion 
might apply.  Instead, the Iskanian court pretermitted preemption analysis 
altogether by holding at the outset that the arbitration clause did not apply to 
the PAGA claim.85 
Essentially, the Iskanian majority put all of its eggs in the Waffle House 
basket.  And that is fine so long as the U.S. Supreme Court does not overturn 
the core premise of Iskanian—that no arbitration agreement is implicated 
because a PAGA plaintiff stands in the shoes of the state.86  So long as the 
Iskanian-Waffle House premise holds, there is no warrant to consider the 
application of FAA preemption in the context of PAGA.  But what if the 
Iskanian-Waffle House rule does not hold up—which would hardly be 
shocking under the U.S. Supreme Court as presently constituted?87  If the 
Court were to hold that, typically, broad arbitration agreements with 
employees do cover PAGA claims, then courts will need to grapple with 
preemption.  Specifically, courts will need to consider whether the FAA 
preempts California’s policy against enforcing a waiver, contained in an 
arbitration agreement, of the right to bring a PAGA claim.  What happens 
then? 
C.  PAGA Preemption Analysis 
One approach to analyzing preemption in the context of California’s policy 
against enforcing PAGA waivers is suggested by Justice Ming Chin’s 
concurrence in Iskanian.88  After observing that, in his view, the arbitration 
agreement by its terms covered “any dispute” between the parties, including 
the plaintiff’s PAGA claim, Justice Chin turned to the merits.89  The PAGA 
 
 83. See id. at 282, 284–85 (holding that an employee’s arbitration clause did not bar the 
EEOC from bringing a claim in court seeking “victim-specific judicial relief, such as backpay, 
reinstatement, and damages” for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 84. On this same basic logic, courts have likewise held that qui tam actions under the 
federal FCA are not subject to arbitration pursuant to a broad arbitration agreement between 
the qui tam relator and the defendant. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot 
Children’s Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 85. Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 133 (“[W]e conclude that the FAA’s goal of promoting 
arbitration as a means of private dispute resolution does not preclude our Legislature from 
deputizing employees to prosecute Labor Code violations on the state’s behalf.”). 
 86. See id. at 151. 
 87. In previous work, we have discussed the possibility that the current Supreme Court 
could “take a different view of whether a broad arbitration provision in the contract of an 
employee . . . may reach a qui tam action brought by that employee.” Gilles & Friedman, 
supra note 28, at 529. 
 88. Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 155 (Chin, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 158 (doubting “the majority’s suggestion that the FAA places no limit on ‘the 
ability of states to enhance their public enforcement capabilities by enlisting willing 
employees in qui tam actions’” (quoting id. at 152 (majority opinion))). 
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statute, he reasoned, provides a substantive remedial claim to the plaintiff.90  
And, Justice Chin noted, an arbitration agreement that explicitly waives the 
right to pursue that sort of statutory claim is unenforceable under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s arbitration case law.91  Specifically, in American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,92 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion made 
clear that the Court would not apply “a provision in an arbitration agreement 
forbidding the assertion of [such] statutory rights.”93  Italian Colors thus 
recognized the long-standing principle that statutory claims are only subject 
to arbitration in the first place “so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”94  Justice 
Chin would apply those vindication of rights principles to hold the arbitration 
agreement unenforceable to the extent that it contained an express waiver of 
the right to pursue a PAGA claim.95 
A split panel of the Ninth Circuit took a very different approach in Sakkab 
v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc.96  As in Iskanian, the issue was 
whether California’s policy against allowing waivers of PAGA claims was 
preempted by the FAA.97  But unlike in Iskanian, the Ninth Circuit did not 
hold that the PAGA claim fell outside of an agreement to arbitrate “any 
dispute”—indeed, it never mentioned that core Waffle House-inflected 
holding of Iskanian.98  Instead, the majority held that the California policy 
against the waiver of PAGA claims constitutes a generally applicable 
contract defense within the meaning of the FAA’s § 2 “saving clause”—one 
equally applicable in the arbitral and judicial settings.99  For this reason, the 
 
 90. Id. at 156–57. 
 91. Id. at 157 (“Although the FAA generally requires enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms, the high court has recognized an exception to this 
requirement for ‘a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain 
statutory rights.’” (first quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 
(2013); and then citing Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
(1985))). 
 92. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 93. See id. at 236. 
 94. Id. at 235 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985)). 
 95. See Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 157 (Chin, J., concurring) (concluding that striking “the 
arbitration agreement [as] invalid insofar as it forbids Iskanian from asserting his statutory 
right under PAGA in any forum does not run afoul of the FAA”). 
 96. 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015).  In so ruling, the panel resolved a growing intracircuit 
conflict over whether the FAA preempted Iskanian. See, e.g., Lucero v. Sears Holdings Mgmt. 
Corp., No. 14-cv-1620, 2014 WL 6984220 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014); Fardig v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc., No. SACV 14-00561, 2014 WL 4782618 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014). 
 97. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 427. 
 98. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 99. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 432 (“To fall within the ambit of § 2’s saving clause, the Iskanian 
rule must be a ‘ground[] . . . for the revocation of any contract.’  We conclude that it is . . . .  
The rule bars any waiver of PAGA claims, regardless of whether the waiver appears in an 
arbitration agreement or a non-arbitration agreement.” (first, second, and third alterations in 
original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 
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Sakkab court held that California’s policy does not conflict with 
arbitration.100 
The Sakkab majority emphasized “‘fundamental[]’ differences between 
PAGA actions and class actions” and held the “rule prohibiting waiver of 
representative PAGA claims”—unlike the rule prohibiting waiver of class 
actions—“does not diminish parties’ freedom to select informal arbitration 
procedures.”101  The court stressed that in PAGA cases, unlike class actions, 
the plaintiff is not vindicating the rights of unnamed employees:  “a PAGA 
action is a statutory action for penalties brought as a proxy for the state, rather 
than a procedure for resolving the claims of other employees.”102  And as a 
consequence, the court held, “there is no need to protect absent employees’ 
due process rights in PAGA arbitrations.”103  Accordingly, all of the due-
process-driven features of class actions that the Concepcion Court held 
inimical to arbitration—including notice and opt-out rights and the right to 
object—are absent in the PAGA context. 
The key point, for the Sakkab majority, was that “PAGA arbitrations . . . 
do not require the formal procedures of class arbitrations” and thus do not 
implicate the obstacle preemption concerns of Concepcion.104  The dissent 
in Sakkab argued that PAGA actions are complex and will embroil 
arbitrations in “procedural morass.”105  But the majority was unmoved—
“even if there were evidence that representative PAGA actions take longer 
or cost more to arbitrate than other types of claims, the same could be said of 
any complex or fact-intensive claim,” such as an antitrust action.106  And the 
court noted the “parties may streamline the resolution of complex PAGA 
claims” as they see fit, including “by agreeing to limit discovery in 
arbitration.”107  In sum, the court held, there is no reason a PAGA claim 
cannot proceed in the arbitral forum.108 
So what is the upshot here for other cases where public policy against 
enforcing the waiver of a state statutory right (such as the right to pursue 
public injunctive relief) collides with an arbitration agreement?  The Iskanian 
 
 100. Id. at 433–34, 439; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 28, at 530 (observing that 
“the California policy against allowing waiver of PAGA claims certainly appears to be a 
generally applicable defense to any contract that purports to effect such a waiver, whether as 
part of an arbitration clause or not”). 
 101. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. 
Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 102. Id. at 436. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 441–42 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes 
of class litigation . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011))). 
 106. Id. at 438. 
 107. Id.  The court also noted that “whether arbitration of representative PAGA actions is 
likely to ‘generate procedural morass’ depends, first and foremost, on the procedures the 
parties select.” Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)). 
 108. Id. at 440 (“That [PAGA] actions can be difficult to arbitrate does not mean that the 
FAA requires courts to enforce private agreements opting out of the state’s chosen method of 
enforcing its labor laws.”). 
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and Sakkab decisions suggest a straightforward sequencing of questions:  (1) 
Is the claim covered by the agreement to arbitrate?  (2) Would the arbitration 
agreement expressly bar a plaintiff from asserting a statutory claim for relief, 
and thus run afoul of the vindication of rights principles reiterated in Italian 
Colors?  (3) Would arbitration of the claim undermine the defining attributes 
of arbitration, such as by triggering obstacle preemption as in Concepcion? 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the latest flash point in the 
conflict between unwaivable rights and mandatory arbitration:  the public 
injunction. 
III.  ROUND THREE:  THE UNWAIVABLE RIGHT TO SEEK PUBLIC 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:  MCGILL AND BLAIR 
Various California consumer protection statutes authorize litigants to seek 
“public injunctive relief”—i.e., relief “designed to prevent further harm to 
the public at large rather than to redress or prevent injury to a plaintiff.”109  
California’s CLRA, for example, authorizes consumers injured by unfair or 
deceptive acts to seek a public injunction aimed at eliminating injury to future 
consumers.110  So, too, may consumers who have “suffered injury in fact and 
[have] lost money or property as a result of” unfair competition seek public 
injunctive relief under California’s UCL.111  Given that the “primary 
purpose” of claims is to stop “unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the 
general public,”112 California courts have long held that the right to pursue a 
public injunction is unwaivable under section 3513.  Indeed, in two pre-
Concepcion decisions, Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California113 and 
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.,114 the California Supreme Court 
held that the right to seek public injunctive relief under the CLRA and UCL 
could not be waived via private arbitration agreement.115 
 
 109. Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 2003). 
 110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2020). 
 111. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 2020). 
 112. McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 87 (Cal. 2017) (dicta) (first citing Cruz, 66 
P.3d at 1164; and then citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 74 (Cal. 
1999)). 
 113. 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). 
 114. 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). 
 115. In both cases, the California Supreme Court went further and held that claims for 
public injunctive relief are simply nonarbitrable. Id. at 1159; Broughton, 988 P.2d at 76; see 
also Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
May 16, 2011) (holding that the FAA “preempts California’s exemption of claims for public 
injunctive relief from arbitration, at least for actions in federal court”).  To that extent, the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized that Concepcion overruled the Broughton-Cruz rule. See Kilgore 
v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 965 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The FAA preempts California’s 
Broughton-Cruz rule that claims for public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated.”); see also 
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that 
the Broughton-Cruz rule is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”). 
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A.  McGill v. Citibank, N.A. 
More recently, and subsequent to Concepcion, the California Supreme 
Court had occasion to consider the enforceability of an arbitration clause that 
would waive the right to seek public injunctive relief, in McGill v. Citibank, 
N.A.116  There, Sharon McGill had lost her job and sought to activate a “credit 
protect[ion] plan” that she had purchased under a Citibank credit card 
agreement in which Citibank agreed to defer payments if a “qualifying event” 
occurred, including job loss.117  When Citibank refused her demand for 
benefits, McGill filed a class action suit alleging violations of California’s 
UCL, CLRA, and false advertising law.118  McGill’s complaint sought, 
“among other things, an injunction prohibiting Citibank from continuing to 
engage in” allegedly fraudulent practices.119 
Citibank responded by seeking to compel arbitration on the basis of an 
arbitration provision in its standard credit card agreement—a clause that also 
barred the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief.120  The 
California Court of Appeal directed that all claims be sent to arbitration, but 
in April 2017, the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s 
judgment in a unanimous decision written by Justice Chin.121 
Key to McGill was that the contract foreclosed awards of public injunctive 
relief in any forum, and not just arbitration, bringing it within the saving 
clause of FAA § 2.122  For Justice Chin, then, the contract prevented the 
plaintiff from vindicating a right vouchsafed by clear California policy—
namely, the right to seek a “public injunction,” which the court defined as 
“relief that has ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ prohibiting unlawful acts 
that threaten future injury to the general public.”123 
Framing the issue largely as he did in his Iskanian concurrence, Justice 
Chin’s decision is grounded in the effective vindication concept of Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.124 and Italian Colors and held 
that the contractual foreclosure of the right to pursue the public injunction 
remedy guaranteed by California law renders the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.125  Quoting Justice Scalia’s decision, Justice Chin explained 
 
 116. 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017). 
 117. Id. at 87. 
 118. Id. at 88. 
 119. Id.; see also David Lazarus, Terms of Citibank Credit Insurance Not Well Disclosed, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2011-nov-
10-la-fi-lazarus-20111111-story.html [https://perma.cc/8TM5-B47C]. 
 120. McGill, 393 P.3d at 88. 
 121. Id. at 87. 
 122. The agreement made arbitration applicable to “any claim” and provided that the 
“arbitrator will not award relief for or against anyone who is not a party.” Id. at 88.  The ban 
on public injunctions thus applies in any forum, and the California policy against enforcement 
of that ban is a “ground[] . . . ‘for the revocation of any contract’” under FAA § 2. Id. at 96 
(first alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 123. Id. at 90 (quoting Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 74 (Cal. 
1999)). 
 124. 473 U.S. 614 (1984). 
 125. McGill, 393 P.3d at 94–95. 
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that Italian Colors “distinguished between the ‘waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies’—such as ‘a provision in an arbitration agreement 
forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights’—and the waiver of a 
‘procedural path to the vindication of every claim’—such as a provision 
forbidding class action arbitration.”126  While the particular effective 
vindication argument made in Italian Colors was unsuccessful,127 the 
majority in that case made clear that the principle is alive and well.  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia noted that numerous Supreme Court cases have “asserted the 
existence of an ‘effective vindication’ exception”128 to the requirements of 
the FAA, and he added that “we do so again here.”129 
Like his Iskanian concurrence, Justice Chin’s analysis in McGill obviates 
any need to probe whether the arbitral forum would otherwise accommodate 
the procedures required for public injunctive relief.  Once we accept that the 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable under the effective vindication 
principle, there is no warrant to apply Concepcion’s preemption inquiry. 
B.  Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. 
Just as it did when it followed Iskanian with Sakkab, the Ninth Circuit 
followed McGill with a case, Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,130 that jumped 
directly into the Concepcion preemption fray by asking whether the 
procedures necessary for a public injunction are compatible with the arbitral 
forum.131  And here again, on the merits of the preemption analysis, the Blair 
court followed Sakkab and found no basis to doubt that the arbitral arena can 
comfortably accommodate a public injunction suit.132  And this makes sense.  
California law places no restraints on standing to seek public injunctive relief 
and does not require a public injunctive claim to be pursued on a class 
basis.133  Thus, there is no basis to argue that public injunction claims entail 
 
 126. Id. at 97 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233, 236 
(2013)). 
 127. As Justice Chin noted, the Italian Colors Court rejected the argument that a class-
banning arbitration clause runs afoul of the effective vindication rule where it so increases the 
cost of arbitration on the individual claimant that it precludes effective vindication of statutory 
rights in a given case. Id. (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 
(2013)). 
 128. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013) (first citing 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); and then citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
 129. Id. at 236. 
 130. 928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 131. See id. at 822.  The Blair court was likely responding to a growing intradistrict conflict 
concerning whether the FAA preempted McGill. Compare McGovern v. U.S. Bank N.A., 362 
F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that the FAA preempts McGill), with Delisle v. 
Speedy Cash, No. 18-CV-2042, 2019 WL 2423090 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (finding no 
preemption), vacated and remanded, No. 19-55794, 2020 WL 3057464 (9th Cir. June 9, 
2020). 
 132. Blair, 928 F.3d at 828–30. 
 133. See, e.g., McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 93 (Cal. 2017) (concluding that a 
claim for public injunctive relief “does not constitute the ‘pursu[it]’ of ‘representative claims 
or relief on behalf of others’” (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
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class procedures that are inimical to the arbitral arena.134  To be sure, the 
individual nonclass plaintiff seeks broad relief in a public injunction suit.  But 
so too do all manner of complex claims that ask an arbitrator to grant broad 
relief.  And here, as in Sakkab, there are no constitutional notice, opt-out, or 
objection rights implicated.135  In fact, as a matter of preclusion, the rights of 
other affected persons are not compromised in the event a plaintiff is 
unsuccessful in a bid to obtain public injunctive relief.136 
The most consequential aspect of Blair, going forward, may be the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding that not only must the plaintiffs’ claim proceed in court 
insofar as it seeks a public injunction but also insofar as that claim seeks class 
action damages.137  Under the operative severability clause in Blair, if any 
provision of the arbitration agreement were found unenforceable “as to a 
particular claim for relief, then that claim (and only that claim) must be 
severed from the arbitration and may be brought in court.”138  Defendant 
Rent-A-Center argued that this meant only the claim seeking the public 
injunction was for a court, while the damages claim should remain in 
arbitration, where the class action ban would apply.139  But the Ninth Circuit 
took a contrary view, reasoning that a single “claim” underlay the requests 
for both injunctive and monetary relief and, under the severance clause, that 
“claim” in its entirety “may be brought in court.”140 
While the Blair litigation settled immediately following the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision,141 the defendants in two companion appeals—summarily resolved 
 
§§ 17203, 17535 (West 2020))); see also id. (observing that California courts have “never . . . 
imposed” a requirement that public injunctive claims be “brought as a class action”). 
 134. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (“Arbitration 
is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010) (describing the “changes brought about by 
the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” as “fundamental”). 
 135. See Blair, 928 F.3d at 828 (finding that, in contrast to Concepcion’s finding that class-
wide arbitration “‘requires procedural formality’ . . . [that] ‘makes the process slower, more 
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment,’” arbitration of 
public injunctive relief claims give rises to neither “state law nor constitutional due process” 
concerns that “require[] procedural formality” (quoting Concepcion, 564 U.S. at 348–49)). 
 136. Because a judgment on a public injunction claim in a nonclass case is preclusive only 
as to the individual plaintiff, there are no due process concerns requiring collective procedures. 
 137. See Blair, 928 F.3d at 830 (“[A] public injunction may involve high stakes and could 
affect a lucrative business practice.  But so could a private injunctive, declaratory, or damages 
action.”). 
 138. Id. at 831.  Notably, other companies employ arbitration provisions that do not 
contemplate severability if an arbitration clause is found unenforceable. See, e.g., Plaintiff-
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 4, McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 772 F. App’x 575 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 17-17246), 2018 WL 3241117, at *4 (quoting an arbitration clause, which 
stated, “[i]f this specific provision is found unenforceable, the entirety of this arbitration 
provision shall be null and void”). 
 139. Blair, 928 F.3d at 823. 
 140. Id. at 831–32 (“A ‘claim for relief,’ as that term is ordinarily used, is synonymous 
with ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’ . . .  We read the clause, as did the district court, to provide 
that the entire claim be severed for judicial determination.” (citations omitted) (citing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a)). 
 141. See Rent-A-Center Customers Reach $13M Price-Gouging Deal, LAW360 (Sept. 6, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1196109/rent-a-center-customers-reach-13m-price-
gouging-deal [https://perma.cc/Y7LU-MGKF] (describing the $13 million settlement). 
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by the same panel that decided Blair142—sought rehearings en banc and then 
certiorari review.143  The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing144 and then, on June 
1, 2020, the Supreme Court denied review in the Blair companion cases.145 
IV.  ROUND FOUR:  AFTER BLAIR,  WHAT NOW? 
The petitioners in the Blair companion cases and their amici, including the 
Chamber of Commerce and others, argued strenuously that the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling—especially insofar as it allowed class action damages claims 
to proceed in court—blows a gaping hole in the otherwise impregnable wall 
of authority protecting class-banning arbitration clauses.146  So long as a 
California plaintiff seeks broad injunctive relief, they complained, Blair 
allows the plaintiff to prosecute a damages class action in court 
notwithstanding the presence of an otherwise enforceable class-banning 
arbitration agreement.147 
Given the enormous stakes and the focused involvement of the Chamber 
of Commerce, one might expect further cases petitioning for certiorari to 
challenge Blair.  But we suspect the Blair ruling will prove durable, if only 
because corporate defendants can readily refashion their arbitration clauses 
to ensure that all issues relating to liability and damages remain in arbitration, 
even where the public injunction claim has been held nonarbitrable.  And 
indeed, the Ninth Circuit anticipated as much in Blair:  “Parties are welcome 
to agree to split decisionmaking between a court and an arbitrator in this 
manner.  But they did not do so here.”148  The ability of corporate defendants 
to save their bans on damages class actions through careful drafting makes 
future attacks on Blair unattractive candidates for Supreme Court review—a 
 
 142. See McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 772 F. App’x 575 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020); Tillage v. Comcast Corp., 772 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020).  Both cases featured arbitration clauses identical to the one in 
Blair and raised the same issue concerning the waivability of the right to seek public injunctive 
relief. 
 143. Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc for Defendants-Appellants, 
Tillage, 772 F. App’x 569 (No. 18-15288); Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En 
Banc, McArdle, 772 F. App’x 575 (No. 17-17246); see also Allison Frankel, Business Lobby 




 144. See Nadia Dried, 9th Circ. Won’t Rethink Voiding AT&T Arbitration Agreement, 
LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2020) https://www.law360.com/articles/1235788/9th-circ-won-t-rethink-
voiding-at-t-arbitration-agreement [https://perma.cc/Z2XM-5H6F]. 
 145. McArdle, 140 S. Ct. 2827; Tillage, 140 S. Ct. 2827. 
 146. Brief Amici Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers & the California Chamber of Commerce in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants, McArdle, 772 F. App’x 575 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-17246). 
 147. See id. at 20–21 (“Accordingly, to hold that the McGill rule escapes the preemptive 
sweep of the FAA would end run Concepcion.  It would allow a plaintiff to evade Concepcion 
and FAA preemption in any case in which he or she could include a UCL claim for public-
injunctive relief.  Given the extraordinary breadth of California’s UCL, this is virtually every 
case.”). 
 148. Blair v. Rent-A-Center, 928 F.3d 819, 831 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 
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point emphasized by the lawyers for Public Citizen, who successfully 
resisted the certiorari petitions in the Blair companion cases.149 
Still, it remains to be seen exactly how companies will redraft their 
arbitration clauses and whether these next-generation provisions will be 
effective in suppressing class action damages suits.  Of course, one foolproof 
option would be to remove any restrictions on arbitrators hearing claims for 
a public injunction.  After all, if the arbitrator is empowered to grant public 
injunctive relief, then there is no basis under McGill for abrogating the 
arbitration provision.150  Thus, Ticketmaster and other companies have 
responded to these rulings by providing in their arbitration clauses that “the 
arbitrator can award public injunctive relief.”151 
But other corporate defendants, apparently uncomfortable allowing an 
arbitrator to make consequential decisions, have instead opted for clauses 
that would allow public injunctive relief to be decided by courts, while 
otherwise calling for arbitration of consumer claims.152  Clauses of this 
type—adopted by Williams-Sonoma, H&R Block, Discover, and others in 
the wake of Blair and McGill—generally provide that all liability issues must 
be tried by an arbitrator.153  Only then, after liability is established in 
arbitration, may the plaintiffs seek a public injunction in court.  Damages 
requests would remain in arbitration, where they are subject to the class-
banning arbitration clause. 
But such a regime may not provide the panacea the Chamber of Commerce 
and its allies seek for several reasons.  First, if the arbitral liability ruling is 
sufficient to serve as a predicate for injunctive proceedings in court, then it 
can presumably serve as a basis for damages arbitrations, which might then 
take the form of mere inquests to be processed on a mass scale.154  Second, 
 
 149. See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 27, McArdle, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (No. 19-
1078) (explaining numerous ways that “the defendant can write its [arbitration] agreement”). 
 150. See supra Part III.A. 
 151. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 149, at 31–32 (describing arbitration 
clauses used by Ticketmaster and Bank of the West). 
 152. Id. at 3 (“McGill allows parties to agree that claims for public injunctive relief must 
be arbitrated, or to agree that all liability issues and other remedial issues must be arbitrated 
while deferring public injunctive relief for later judicial resolution.  Many companies have 
crafted valid and enforceable agreements to provide for arbitration in one of those ways.  
McGill holds only that the parties cannot waive public-injunction claims altogether.”). 
 153. See id. at 3, 32.  For example, H&R Block’s newly redrafted arbitration clause states: 
If a court decides that applicable law precludes enforcement of any of this 
paragraph’s limitations as to a particular claim or any particular remedy for a claim 
(such as a request for public injunctive relief), then that particular claim or particular 
remedy (and only that particular claim or particular remedy) must remain in court 
and be severed from any arbitration. 
Id. at 32 (quoting H&R Block® Desktop Tax Software End User License Agreement, H&R 
BLOCK 13, https://www.hrblock.com/pdf/HRBlock-Software-License-Agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VT6-8GPZ] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020)). 
 154. Mass arbitrations require arbitrators to accord preclusive effect to prior arbitral 
decisions. Cf. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a 
Post-class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 469 (2014).  While there are generally reasons 
to question the existence of intra-arbitral preclusion, see generally Myriam Gilles, The Day 
Doctrine Died:  Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, some 
472 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
if the liability findings and underlying evidence from arbitration hearings are 
to serve as a predicate for a public judicial trial on equitable remedies, then 
the parties must agree to relinquish the strict confidentiality provisions that 
would otherwise attend the arbitrations.  And this model—where arbitral 
liability rulings are a springboard for judicial remedial proceedings—raises 
the question of what happens if multiple arbitrations are filed.  If several 
plaintiffs file one-on-one arbitrations before different arbitrators, which 
liability ruling provides the springboard for the judicial remedial class 
action? 
Meanwhile, no matter how companies may redraft their arbitration 
provisions, there is one category of cases that will remain free under Blair to 
proceed in court with claims that seek both class damages and public 
injunctions—namely, cases that have been (or will be) filed before the 
companies institute their redrafted severance provisions.  Courts have held 
that once a class action is on file, the unilateral change-in-terms mailers that 
companies rely on to engraft new terms into their contracts cannot rewrite 
the rules under which pending disputes are to be resolved.  For example, as 
Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York noted in In re 
Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation,155 “putative class members’ 
rights in this litigation were protected as of the filing date of the 
complaint.”156  Thus, the court held that “arbitration clauses engrafted . . . on 
cardholder agreements after this litigation commenced are not enforceable.  
Conversely, [the] arbitration agreements entered into before this litigation are 
enforceable . . . .”157  Other courts and commentators are in accord.158 
 
scholars maintain that arbitrators “can be contractually required to follow precedents.” Id. at 
411 n.232 (quoting Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law 
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 746 (1999)).  If those scholars are correct, then 
enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers may find it profitable to aggregate a critical mass of individual 
arbitrations in the wake of a public injunctive ruling. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, 
The Issue Class Revolution, 101 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing methods by 
which entrepreneurial lawyers can scoop up sufficient numbers of claimants to cost effectively 
file individual damages claims in arbitration). 
 155. 361 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 156. Id. at 251.  This time-of-filing rule for assessing the applicable dispute resolution 
terms mirrors the familiar time-of-filing rules for purposes of determining diversity 
jurisdiction.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal jurisdiction based on diversity depends solely 
on the facts that exist at the time an action is brought—no matter the changes to the parties’ 
domiciles that may later occur. See Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) 
(“[T]he jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action 
brought.”). 
 157. In re Currency Conversion, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 158. See Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 882 F.3d 1017, 1021–22 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating 
that arbitration terms that are “entered into mid-litigation” via a mass mailing “d[o] not evict 
a pending lawsuit from court” (citing Russell v. Citigroup, Inc., 748 F.3d 677, 680–81 (6th 
Cir. 2014))); Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381, 433 (2018) 
(“Courts . . . have held that companies can impose arbitration clauses requiring that all 
claims—including those arising before the insertion of the arbitration clause into the consumer 
contract—must be arbitrated, so long as the arbitration clause is imposed before the 
commencement of the litigation.”).  On the other hand, one court purported to distinguish In 
re Currency Conversion and held that a midlitigation change-in-terms mailer that amends an 
arbitration agreement is enforceable, as opposed to a change-in-terms mailer that introduces 
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In addition to identifying the time of filing as the point for identifying the 
rules that will govern dispute resolution, Judge Pauley provided two 
additional grounds for the ruling.  First, unilateral change-in-terms mailers 
running from defendants to putative class members constitute proscribed 
communications with class members under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(d), which demands judicial approval of communications that might “alter 
the status of [already filed] litigation and the available remedies.”159  And 
second, to the extent class members are deemed to have “agreed” to the new 
arbitration terms without having been advised how those terms affect 
ongoing litigation, the resulting agreements are unenforceable under 
applicable state law unconscionability principles because “[t]here was no 
reasonable manner for cardholders to know that by failing to reject the 
arbitration clause, they were forfeiting their rights as potential plaintiffs in 
this litigation.”160  But no matter how the argument is articulated, the point 
is the same:  unilateral efforts to change the rules of the game midstream, via 
change-in-terms mailers, are likely to be met with deep judicial skepticism. 
CONCLUSION 
Long-standing California statutes declare that any “law established for a 
public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement”161 and further, 
that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object . . . to exempt any one from 
responsibility for his own fraud . . . or violation of law . . . are against the 
policy of the law.”162  Early California lawmakers understood well that if 
laws enacted for the general welfare could be controverted by private 
agreement, then those with superior bargaining power in the market could 
force weaker parties to surrender their substantive legal rights.  In the modern 
era, these anti-waiver and anti-exculpation principles have been employed 
for the protection of workers and consumers seeking public injunctive 
remedies benefitting the general public, even where these litigants are 
otherwise subject to arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts.  While 
other forms of state regulation of arbitration clauses have been found 
impliedly preempted by the FAA, the Ninth Circuit and California Supreme 
Court have now repeatedly reaffirmed the state’s long-standing prohibitions 
on private contractual waivers of substantive rights, even where those 
waivers are couched in otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements.163 
 
arbitration for the first time. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, 
at *6–7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).  The court offered no rationale for this distinction, and it 
appears to us arbitrary. 
 159. In re Currency Conversion, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (quoting In re Currency 
Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 224 F.R.D. 555, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  A “unilateral 
communications scheme,” the court noted, is especially “rife with potential for coercion.  If 
the class and the class opponent are involved in an ongoing business relationship, 
communications from the class opponent to the class may be coercive.” Id. at 253 (quoting 
Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 160. Id. at 251. 
 161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2020). 
 162. Id. § 1668. 
 163. See supra Part III. 
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What all of this portends for aggregate litigation is not entirely clear.  On 
the one hand, these doctrinal developments are specific to California law.  
But on the other, California represents a huge swath of the litigation 
ecosystem, and its decisional law could potentially provide a template for 
other states.164  In the near term, the most visible effect of these developments 
is likely to be damages class actions proceeding in California state courts 
where defendants cling to arbitration agreements that ban arbitrators from 
issuing public injunctions and are insufficiently nuanced in their treatment of 
severability.  But as corporate drafting evolves to block future class actions 
seeking monetary damages, the most enduring legacy of Iskanian, Sakkab, 
McGill, and Blair may not be PAGA cases or public injunctive suits at all 
but, rather the unbowed commitment of California courts to principles of 
unwaivable public rights, even in an era of arbitration hegemony. 
 
 164. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 28, at 512 n.119 (describing PAGA-like bills 
currently pending in various states). 
